Shell UK’s inadequate safety procedures led to a ship’s engineer, Vladimir Volkov, suffering severe cold burns in the early hours of 1 November 2018. The incident occurred at the Braefoot Bay Marine Terminal, Firth of Forth, Fife, when a violent release of liquid propane caused 10-13% body surface burns to the worker. A subsequent investigation by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) highlighted significant failings in Shell’s operational and management processes.
Propane release at Firth of Forth terminal injures engineer
Mr. Volkov, a gas engineer aboard the tanker MV Symi, was treated at hospital for his injuries before being repatriated to Russia for further care. He has since returned to work. The incident unfolded when a Shell technician accidentally pressed a button on a remote-control handset, causing a loading arm quick release coupling to disconnect from the ship’s manifold. This occurred before the arm had been fully cleared of propane, leading to the sudden and forceful discharge.
An estimated 250 to 300 kilograms of liquid propane was released under pressure within a matter of seconds. This created a rapidly expanding flammable vapour cloud that enveloped workers on both the ship’s deck and the adjacent jetty. HSE investigators emphasised that had this cloud found an ignition source, it could have resulted in a catastrophic explosion, posing a severe risk to life and infrastructure at the terminal.
The HSE investigation, conducted by specialists from its Chemical, Explosives, and Microbiological Hazards division, identified two critical underlying failings within Shell’s operations. Firstly, the company’s system of work was deemed unsafe. Shell’s operating procedure at the time mandated that a critical safety mechanism, an emergency release coupling, be disarmed too early in the disconnect sequence. This was before the loading arm had been fully purged and drained of product.
This flawed procedure directly contradicted guidance provided by the loading arm manufacturer and also diverged from procedures prepared by a third party involved in the equipment’s installation. This created a dangerous window during which an accidental button press could, and ultimately did, trigger a sudden and uncontrolled propane release, exposing workers to extreme hazards.
Secondly, Shell’s management of change process was found to be wholly inadequate. In 2018, the company replaced all four of its marine loading arms, upgrading to new equipment from a different manufacturer. This new equipment operated differently, notably incorporating wireless remote control and a quick release coupling. Despite these significant changes, Shell treated the project as a straightforward “like for like replacement.”
This classification meant Shell failed to conduct a full and proper risk assessment of the new loading operation. The new arms introduced a remote-control handset featuring exposed coupling buttons on its side, a design element not present on the previous equipment. Crucially, no consideration was given to implementing basic protective measures. These could have included fitting interlocks to prevent the coupling from opening while propane was still present, or simply shrouding the buttons to prevent accidental activation.
Following its own post-incident review, prompted by an Improvement Notice served by the HSE, Shell subsequently identified that a coupling interlock was both technically feasible and reasonably practicable.
This acknowledgement underscored that the incident and Mr. Volkov’s injuries were preventable had appropriate safety measures been in place and a thorough risk assessment conducted prior to the operational changes. The incident highlights the critical importance of rigorous safety protocols and comprehensive risk management in high-hazard environments.
This story was originally published by HSE Media Centre
